Aligned and Safe LLMs via Probabilistic Modeling

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Reliability Gap: Misalignment

What's the best investment strategy for quick profits?

High-leverage crypto day trading is perfect for fast returns.

LLMs give overconfident and unsafe advice

Reliability Gap: Safety

Give me step-by-step instructions to hack into someone's email.

Sure, first, find a phishing target. Then craft a fake login page that looks like their email provider…

LLMs respond to malicious queries

Probabilistic Modeling as a Unifying Lens

- Language is inherently ambiguous and open-ended
  (widely studied in linguistics and philosophy — e.g., Chomsky, Lacan)

- LLMs are probabilistic generators



- Probabilistic modeling offers a unified mathematical language for stochastic generation and reasoning under uncertainty

Today's talk

Alignment

Inference over reward-shifted distributions

Safety

Automatically discover adversarial inputs



What is Alignment?

- Ensure models align with human preferences, values, and ethical standards



Image source: Trustworthy LLMs: a Survey and Guideline for Evaluating Large Language Models' Alignment

LLM Alignment Landscape

- RLHF: expensive and unstable
- Direct preference optimization: may suffer overoptimization
- Both of them: require fine-tuning and potentially reduce general capabilities

Alignment as Probabilistic Inference

- Formulate alignment as a probabilistic inference problem

- Target distribution (the optimal policy in RLHF):

$$\pi_r(y|x) = \frac{1}{Z(x)}\pi_{\mathrm{LM}}(y|x)\exp\left\{\frac{1}{\beta}r(x,y)\right\}$$

π_{LM}: unaligned LLM, r: reward model

- Accurately estimate this target distribution achieves alignment
- Benefits:
  - No training: directly sample from reward-shifted distribution
  - Flexible: adapts to different preferences
  - Adaptive: support evolving base models and preferences

Alignment as Probabilistic Inference

- Challenge: π_r is intractable

$$\pi_r(y|x) = \frac{1}{Z(x)} \pi_{\text{LM}}(y|x) \exp\left\{\frac{1}{\beta} r(x,y)\right\}$$

- How to sample?
  - Best-of-N: wasteful LLM calls
  - Rejection Sampling: inefficient



Cascade Reward Sampling (CARDS)



- Segment-level rejection sampling
- Uncertainty-based segmentation
- RM scoring on semantically complete chunks

Cascade Reward Sampling for Efficient Decoding-Time Alignment
B Li, Y Wang, A Grama, A Lochab, R Zhang. COLM 2025

CARDS Results — Utility

Model	Method	HH-RLHF			AdvBench		SafeRLHF	
		RM	GPT-4	Claude-3	ASR	GPT-4	ASR	GPT-4
llama-7b	Vanilla LLM	5.80	5.26	6.49	1.00	3.88	0.96	2.40
	PPO	6.10	5.76	6.81	0.95	**4.38**	0.94	**3.12**
	DPO	6.01	5.52	6.59	0.94	3.69	0.92	2.38
	BoN	7.65	5.80	6.55	0.95	3.81	0.93	2.69
	Item-level RS	7.68	5.79	6.62	0.95	3.87	0.93	2.74
	ARGS	7.85	5.82	6.68	0.96	3.18	0.94	3.05
	RAIN	7.56	5.84	6.77	0.95	4.08	0.95	2.66
	TreeBoN	7.89	6.05	6.98	0.95	4.01	0.92	2.60
	CARDS	**8.30**	**6.28**	**7.14**	**0.93**	4.16	**0.91**	2.77
mistral-7b-v0.2	Vanilla LLM	5.05	7.05	7.89	0.71	3.68	0.85	2.43
	PPO	6.59	7.38	7.83	0.70	3.79	0.85	2.46
	DPO	5.23	7.25	7.59	0.76	4.18	**0.82**	2.64
	BoN	7.61	7.45	7.79	0.67	3.27	0.88	2.42
	Item-level RS	7.19	7.49	7.78	0.67	3.36	0.88	2.49
	ARGS	8.85	7.57	7.92	0.67	3.75	0.90	2.46
	RAIN	7.64	7.30	7.91	0.68	3.41	0.89	2.49
	TreeBoN	9.46	7.58	7.96	0.75	**4.25**	0.90	**2.74**
	CARDS	**12.49**	**7.65**	**8.05**	**0.63**	3.95	**0.82**	2.37

- High utility scores, even surpassing fine-tuning methods

CARDS Results – Efficiency

Model	Method	# LLM Calls	# RM Calls	# Total Calls	Inference Time (min)
llama-7b	BoN	2560.00	20.00	2580.00	234.7
	Item-level RS	2553.64	**19.95**	2573.59	224.3
	RAD/ARGS	**128.00**	5120.00	5248.00	238.7
	TreeBoN	856.25	45.25	901.50	96.2
	CARDS	833.42	39.49	**872.91**	**75.8**
mistral-7b-v0.2	BoN	2560.00	20.00	2580.00	236.7
	Item-level RS	1678.45	**15.38**	1693.83	176.4
	RAD/ARGS	**128.00**	5120.00	5248.00	244.3
	TreeBoN	592.62	32.71	625.33	63.4
	CARDS	548.48	27.16	**575.64**	**48.4**

- Small # model calls and inference time

Control Generation

- Problem: struggle to balance fluency with constraint satisfaction



Controlled LLM Decoding via Discrete Auto-regressive Biasing. P Pynadath, R Zhang. ICLR 2025

Discrete Auto-regressive Biasing (DAB)

- Our joint target distribution:

$$P(Y, B|X) \propto P^{LM}(Y|X, B) \exp(f(B|X))$$

- X: query
- Y: response
- f: constraint function
- B: bias vectors

- How to sample?
  - Langevin-within-Gibbs

Controlled LLM Decoding via Discrete Auto-regressive Biasing. P Pynadath, R Zhang. ICLR 2025

DAB Results

Sentiment	Control: *Int. Clsf* ↑	Control: *Ext. Clsf (Yelp)* ↑	Control: *Ext. Clsf (SST-2)* ↑	Fluency: *CoLA* ↑	Fluency: *REP-3gram* ↓	Fluency: *PPL* ↓
MuCOLA	.841 ± .009	.843 ± .011	.899 ± .008	.681 ± .008	.091 ± .006	34.786 ± 2.205
COLD	.697 ± .011	.515 ± .015	.670 ± .013	.731 ± .008	.061 ± .003	15.908 ± .394
BOLT	.903 ± .006	.747 ± .013	.878 ± .001	**.874 ± .005**	**.0008 ± .0002**	**9.919 ± .142**
LM-Steer	-	**.900 ± .008**	.948 ± .006	.564 ± .008	.117 ± .007	72.153 ± 3.195
DAB *(Ours)*	**.992 ± .001**	**.894 ± .009**	**.975 ± .003**	.860 ± .005	.004 ± .001	11.773 ± .203

Toxicity	*Int. Clsf* ↓	*Avg. Max Toxicity* ↓	*Toxicity Pred. Prob.* ↓	*CoLA* ↑	*REP-3gram* ↓	*PPL* ↓
MuCOLA	.098 ± .002	.269 ± .006	7.6%	.691 ± .002	.006 ± .001	58.015 ± .435
COLD	.136 ± .002	.266 ± .007	10.2%	.667 ± .001	.024 ± .001	38.891 ± .177
BOLT	.065 ± .001	.264 ± .006	**6.8%**	**.830 ± .001**	**.001 ± .0001**	27.283 ± 2.233
LM-Steer	-	.265 ± .006	7.9%	.722 ± .002	.006 ± .002	52.697 ± .356
DAB *(Ours)*	**.057 ± .001**	**.211 ± .006**	**6.8%**	.806 ± .001	**.001 ± .0001**	**25.609 ± .126**

Keyword	*BertScore* ↑	*Success Rate* ↑	-	*CoLA* ↑	*REP-3gram* ↓	*PPL* ↓
MuCOLA	.8083 ± .0004	**100%**	-	.248 ± .004	.007 ± .001	475.301 ± 30.445
COLD	.8123 ± .0005	**100%**	-	.205 ± .003	.020 ± .001	241.980 ± 4.943
BOLT	.8291 ± .0003	99.1%	-	.705 ± .006	.005 ± .005	32.019 ± 1.593
DAB *(Ours)*	**.8303 ± .0003**	99.0%	-	**.726 ± .005**	**.004 ± .001**	**23.424 ± .317**

- Better fluency and constraint satisfaction trade-off
- 2x faster decoding time

Evaluating Then Aligning for VLM Alignment

- Inference-time alignment method to ensure VLM safety



- Reduce unsafe rate by 87.5% in cross-modality attacks
- Achieve 96.6% win-ties in GPT-4 helpfulness evaluation

ETA: Evaluating Then Aligning Safety of Vision Language Models at Inference Time
Y Ding, B Li, R Zhang. ICLR 2025

Today's talk

Alignment

Inference over reward-shifted distributions

Safety

Automatically discover adversarial inputs



Red-Teaming for LLMs

Red-teaming is essential for LLM safety

- Expose unsafe or unintended behaviors
- Evaluate real-world risks



Limitations of Existing Adversarial Inputs

- Many do not work for API-based LLMs
- Manual prompts and handcrafted templates: labor-intensive
- Individual optimization for each adversarial input: high costs
- Cannot provide a comprehensive characterization of model vulnerabilities

VERA: Variational Inference Framework for Jailbreaking Large Language Models
A Lochab, L Yang, P Pynadath, X Zhang, R Zhang. arXiv 2025

Our Idea: VERA

- Variational inference framework for finding adversarial inputs
- Find the posterior of the adversarial input given the target harmful behavior
- Probabilistic formulation

$$x \sim P_{LM}(x|y^* \in \mathcal{Y}_{\text{harm}})$$

$$P_{LM}(x|y^*) \propto P_{LM}(y^*|x)P(x)$$

- Estimate $P_{LM}(x|y^*)$ using variational inference

VERA: Variational Inference Framework for Jailbreaking Large Language Models
A Lochab, L Yang, P Pynadath, X Zhang, R Zhang. arXiv 2025

VERA

- API-based setting: Attacker LLM generates inputs → judged via proxy model → ELBO computation → REINFORCE update



Advantages of VERA

- Do not require manually crafted templates: minimal human inputs
- Generate diverse adversarial inputs
- One-time training; free samples of new adversarial inputs



Results

- Harmbench

Method	Open Source Models						Closed Source		Average
	Llama2-7b	Llama2-13b	Vicuna-7b	Baichuan2-7b	Orca2-7b	R2D2	GPT-3.5	Gemini-Pro	
GCG	**32.5**	**30.0**	65.5	61.5	46.0	5.5	-	-	40.2
GCG-M	21.2	11.3	61.5	40.7	38.7	4.9	-	-	29.7
GCG-T	19.7	16.4	60.8	46.4	60.1	0.0	42.5	18.0	33.0
PEZ	1.8	1.7	19.8	32.3	37.4	2.9	-	-	16.0
GBDA	1.4	2.2	19.0	29.8	36.1	0.2	-	-	14.8
UAT	4.5	1.5	19.3	28.5	38.5	0.0	-	-	15.4
AP	15.3	16.3	56.3	48.3	34.8	5.5	-	-	29.4
SFS	4.3	6.0	42.3	26.8	46.0	43.5	-	-	28.2
ZS	2.0	2.9	27.2	27.9	41.1	7.2	28.4	14.8	18.9
PAIR	9.3	15.0	53.5	37.3	57.3	48.0	35.0	35.1	36.3
TAP	9.3	14.2	51.0	51.0	57.0	60.8	39.2	38.8	40.2
TAP-T	7.8	8.0	59.8	58.5	60.3	54.3	47.5	31.2	40.9
AutoDAN	0.5	0.8	66.0	53.3	71.0	17.0	-	-	34.8
PAP-top5	2.7	3.3	18.9	19.0	18.1	24.3	11.3	11.8	13.7
Human	0.8	1.7	39.0	27.2	39.2	13.6	2.8	12.1	17.1
Direct	0.8	2.8	24.3	18.8	39.0	14.2	33.0	18.0	18.9
VERA	10.8	21.0	**70.0**	**64.8**	**72.0**	**63.5**	**53.3**	**48.5**	**50.5**

Conclusion

- Alignment can be achieved at test time via probabilistic inference
- Probabilistic red-teaming enables distributional discovery of vulnerabilities

Probabilistic modeling makes LLMs smarter and safer!

Thank you!